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Abstract
1. Conservation conflicts exist in complex socio-ecological systems and are damag-
ing to both people and wildlife. There is much interest in designing interventions 
to manage them more effectively, but the importance of who does the intervening 
remains underexplored.
2. In particular, conflicts are influenced by perceptions of the trustworthiness of nat-
ural resource managers and conservation organizations. However, experimental 
studies of how the different facets of trustworthiness shape responses to inter-
ventions are rare in conflict settings.
3. We develop an experimental, framed public goods game to test how support for 
otherwise identical elephant conflict interventions varies with perceptions of the 
trustworthiness of two different intervening groups—a community group or a 
conservation organization—and compare game behaviour to pre- and post-game 
interviews.
4. Results from three agro-pastoral communities (n = 212 participants) in northern 
Tanzania show that participants cooperate more with interveners they perceive to 
be more trustworthy. Results also suggest that different aspects of trustworthi-
ness matter differentially—with perceptions of interveners' integrity and benevo-
lence more strongly predicting cooperation than perceptions of their ability.
5. The findings suggest that trust-building and greater consideration of who is best 
placed to intervene in conflicts may help improve natural resource management 
and increase stakeholder support for conservation interventions. This study also 
further demonstrates how experimental games offer opportunities to test behav-
iour change interventions and help to inform evidence-based conservation.
K E Y W O R D S
behaviour change, community-based conservation, game theory, human–wildlife conflict, 
natural resource management, Tanzania
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1  | INTRODUC TION
Conflicts can occur wherever conservation and other human ob-
jectives clash (Redpath et al., 2013). Although they often revolve 
around wildlife impacts or resource-use restrictions, they exist 
within complex socio-ecological systems (Mason et al., 2018), 
which are shaped by evolving ecological processes, behaviours 
and stakeholder relations (Elston, Spezia, Baines, & Redpath, 2014; 
Mason, Keane, Redpath, & Bunnefeld, 2017; Redpath, Bhatia, & 
Young, 2015). Different stakeholders respond differently to differ-
ent actors and interveners within conservation conflicts (Marshall, 
White, & Fischer, 2007; Mishra, Young, Fiechter, Rutherford, & 
Redpath, 2017). One important factor known to mediate these 
relationships is trust (Sharp & Curtis, 2014; Stern, 2008a; Young, 
Searle, et al., 2016). In particular, levels of stakeholder trust—in 
other resource users, managers and institutions—have been shown 
to influence many behaviours relevant to conservation manage-
ment, from cooperation (Andersson et al., 2018; Davenport, Leahy, 
Anderson, & Jakes, 2007; Rudolph & Riley, 2014; Smith, Leahy, 
Anderson, & Davenport, 2013) and compliance (Hamm, Hoffman, 
Tomkins, & Bornstein, 2016; Rudolph & Riley, 2017; Schroeder, 
Fulton, Lawrence, & Cordts, 2017) to support for interventions 
and resolution (Cvetkovich & Winter, 2003; Sjölander-Lindqvist, 
Johansson, & Sandström, 2015; Young, Thompson, et al., 2016). 
These  conservation-specific examples complement a rich wider 
literature demonstrating the importance of trust in shaping co-
operation with interveners and institutions (e.g. Hough, Jackson, 
Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010; Pirson & Malhotra, 2010; 
Siegrist, 2000; Terpstra, 2011).
Conceptualizations of both trust and trustworthiness vary by 
approach and context (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007; Thielmann & 
Hilbig, 2015; Young, Searle, et al., 2016). However, a widely accepted 
definition in conservation (Riley, Ford, Triezenberg, & Lederle, 2018; 
Young, Searle, et al., 2016) describes trust as a product of social 
relationships whereby actors ‘accept vulnerability based upon posi-
tive expectations of the intentions or behaviours of others’ (Rousseau, 
Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer, 1998, p. 395). This definition draws specific 
attention to the role of trustworthiness, which is itself defined in 
terms of an actor's beliefs about others (Sharp, Thwaites, Curtis, & 
Millar, 2013). Trustworthiness encompasses perceptions of an ac-
tor's ability to carry out an action, their benevolence (i.e. their inten-
tion to act in the interest of the trustor) and their integrity (i.e. their 
adherence to an acceptable set of principles; Mayer, Davis, & 
Schoorman, 1995). Alongside risk, these perceptions of trustworthi-
ness are thought to shape the levels of trust in both individuals (in-
terpersonal trust) and organizations (organizational trust; Davenport 
et al., 2007; Pirson & Malhotra, 2010; Riley et al., 2018). Stern and 
Coleman (2015) identify four forms of trust: dispositional trust (i.e. 
the general tendency to trust others), rational trust (i.e. trust based 
on calculated decision-making), affinitive trust (i.e. trust based on 
relationships between trustor and trustee) and procedural trust 
(i.e. trust based on interactions and systems governing between 
trustor and trustee).
Perceptions of a resource manager's ability are considered for-
mative in assessments of rational trust, whereas perceptions of 
their integrity and benevolence tend to inform assessments of af-
finitive trust (Stern & Coleman, 2015). Likewise, trustworthiness is 
considered an important determinant of perceptions of procedural 
justice, which alongside perceptions of competence, is thought to 
dictate the levels of organizational trust (Riley et al., 2018; Rudolph 
& Riley, 2017). In one study, perceptions of the trustworthiness of 
fishery management (including perceptions of deception) predicted 
the rates of compliance (Shirley & Gore, 2019), and in another, trust 
in a state wildlife agency was more strongly predicted by the per-
ceptions of procedural fairness than technical competence (Riley 
et al., 2018). Hence it appears likely that the different components of 
trustworthiness influence trust and conflict-related behaviours dif-
ferentially. However, experimental evidence testing the relationship 
between trustworthiness and responses to interventions remains 
rare in wildlife conservation settings. Such studies are important for 
testing behavioural theory and management assumptions while pro-
viding much-needed evidence to inform conservation interventions 
(Pollard et al., 2019; St. John, 2014; Sutherland & Wordley, 2017).
The purpose of this study is to experimentally test the importance 
of three components of trustworthiness—ability, benevolence and 
integrity (Stern & Coleman, 2015)—in shaping stakeholder support 
for conflict-reducing conservation interventions. To do so, we use a 
novel experimental public goods game, framed around elephant con-
flict interventions, in a Tanzanian Community Wildlife Management 
Area (WMA). Our game draws upon classic games in behavioural eco-
nomics (Cookson, 2000; Hasson, Löfgren, & Visser, 2010) and recent 
games in conservation research (Redpath et al., 2018). Specifically, we 
test whether cooperation with interventions is linked to the identity 
of the intervening group (organization) and perceptions of their trust-
worthiness measured in pre-game surveys. These results are then 
contextualized using post-game individual and group debrief inter-
views to help to inform conflict intervention best practice.
1.1 | Study area
We conducted our study across three villages in Enduimet Wildlife 
Management Area (WMA), northern Tanzania—a wildlife corridor 
in the Amboseli-Kilimanjaro ecosystem where conflicts between 
local communities and elephant Loxodonta africana conserva-
tion are rife and damaging (Bluwstein, Moyo, & Kicheleri, 2016; 
Homewood, 2017). Here, communities derive some material ben-
efits from conservation-related income, and a local conservation 
organization works with the government to administer the WMA 
(Wright, 2017). Conflict interventions range from WMA officers 
using vehicles to deter wildlife, to them distributing torches and fire-
crackers to local young men of the ‘Moran’ age-set—who in Maasai 
culture are the traditional defenders of villages from both people 
and wildlife. Moran frequently form small groups to guard village 
crops from elephants and other herbivores at night, but crop-raiding 
is still common. Compensation payments have been promised for 
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wildlife-related damage or human deaths, but none have been de-
livered (Homewood, 2017) and there is a history of distrust and 
resentment towards tourism operators and the WMA among some 
residents (Wright, 2017).
2  | MATERIAL S AND METHODS
2.1 | Game design
To ease game and participant organization in the rural field setting 
and maximize statistical power, our experimental public goods game 
employed a within-subject design (N = 212) with four players assem-
bled around a physical board. Following classic public goods games 
(Cookson, 2000), players were instructed that the total amount 
of tokens they each amassed during each game would determine 
their earnings. In each of five rounds, participants were endowed 
with five crop-tokens, and one additional token that they could 
choose to a) contribute towards elephant guarding (at a personal 
cost in income, but to a group benefit in reduced crop loss) or, to b) 
keep for themselves (personal benefit, group cost). The two treat-
ments differed only in the description of the group providing the 
elephant guarding: government-led WMA or community-led Moran 
(Supporting Information, Game design). Although per-round there 
was a 50% chance each player incurred crop-raiding, the damage 
incurred (i.e. number of tokens lost) decreased in proportion to the 
total elephant-guarding contribution (Equation 1).
where C is the expected loss from crop-raiding, P is the probability 
of crop-raid (0.5) and N is the number of cooperators (represented as 
number of guarders).
For any one player, the expected personal benefit from coop-
erating—public marginal per capita return (MPCRpublic; Hasson 
et al., 2010)—was half a token, which was less than the expected 
personal benefit of not cooperating (MPCRprivate), which was one 
token. Both were less than the total group benefit of any one play-
er's cooperation (n × MPCRpublic) which were two tokens. Hence, the 
game satisfies the conditions for a social dilemma (Equation 2), since 
for rational individuals maximizing short-term earnings, it pays less 
to cooperate (Table 1).
where n is the number of players.
Each group played the game twice (with the order of the treatment 
rotated). Players were able make comments to each other within the 
group throughout the game (such as commiserating losses or wishing 
for luck), but they were asked not to discuss their previous or intended 
cooperation decisions, and this rule was observed without problem 
throughout the games. Cooperation decisions were made anony-
mously, and were never disclosed (Aswani, Gurney, Mulville, Matera, 
(1)C = P(5 − N),
(2)MPCRpublic <MPCRprivate < n ×MPCRpublic,
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& Gurven, 2013). Players were compensated 5,000 Tsh (approximately 
2.20 USD) for participating, and received an additional 100 Tsh per 
token amassed (max 6,000 Tsh)—which compares to the average 
income per adult in the district of approximately 0.16 USD per day 
(Homewood, Trench, & Brockington, 2012).
2.2 | Data collection
Between April and June 2017, male participants from three villages 
in Enduimet WMA were recruited from randomly ordered lists of 
inhabitants known to be present in each village, created in consulta-
tion with village chairpersons (Supporting Information, Participant re-
cruitment). As cultural norms prevented gender mixing (Smith, 2015), 
rather than split the experiment across male- and female-only samples 
(e.g. Keane et al., 2016), we opted to maximize statistical power and 
the sample size within one group—males—who were also more domi-
nant in wildlife guarding (Homewood, Kristjanson, & Trench, 2009) 
and more easily recruited. However, as recruitment was achieved via 
mobile phones, which have high but not universal penetration in the 
local area (Soares, 2018), the sample was likely biased towards more 
literate and potentially wealthier males.
TA B L E  2   List of explanatory variables included in each model (inclusion marked by ‘x’), the source of data and descriptive summaries
Explanatory 
variables Levels Source Descriptive summary (N)
Model
1 2 3 4 5
Treatment [Moran] [WMA] Group framed as delivering 
guarding intervention (factor)
Moran (N = 212), WMA (N = 212) x x x x x
Order [Moran first]  
[WMA first]
Treatment order (factor) Moran first (N = 104), WMA first 
(N = 108)
x x x x x
Time [First] [Second] Village cohort (factor) First (N = 104), second (N = 108) x
Trustworthiness: 
Aggregated
Weighted summation (factor 
scores) of ability, benevolence 
and integrity trustworthiness 
(numeric)
Moran (M = 0.725, SD = 1.69), 
WMA (M = −0.725, SD = 1.60), 
range = −1 to 1
x
Trustworthiness: 
Ability
Survey, 4-point Likert scale, 
(numeric)
Moran (M = 2.94, SD = 1.09), WMA 
(M = 2.26, SD = 0.96), range = 1–4
x x x
Trustworthiness: 
Benevolence
Survey, 4-point Likert scale, 
(numeric)
Moran (M = 3.21, SD = 1.12), WMA 
(M 2.08, SD = 1.03), range = 1–4
x x x
Trustworthiness: 
Integrity
Survey, 4-point Likert scale, 
(numeric)
Moran (M = 2.95, SD = 1.17), WMA 
(M = 2.46, SD = 1.19), range = 1–4
x x x
Agriculturalist Survey, self-reported proportion 
of livelihood that is agriculture, 
converted to 1–5 scale 
(numeric)
M: 3.07, range = 1–5, SD = 1.13 x x
Elephant 
tolerance
Weighted summation (Factor 
Scores) from four survey 
questions (Kansky & 
Knight, 2014; numeric)
M = 0.00, range = −1 to 1, SD = 1.52 x x
Crop loss Survey, self-reported annual 
crops loss to elephants 
(number of bags; numeric)
M = 16.87, range: 1–90, SD = 0.87 x x
Fear [None] [Some] 
[Frequent]
Survey, self-reported (factor) None (N = 36), some (N = 97), 
frequent (N = 79)
x x
Age [Moran] [Junior 
Elder] [Middle 
Elder] 
[Senior Elder]
Survey, by traditional Maasai 
age-set(s) (factor)
Moran (N = 45), Junior elder 
(N = 78), Middle elder (N = 56), 
Senior elder (N = 33)
x
Wealth [Very Poor] [Poor] 
[Not Poor] [Rich]
As determined by village leaders 
with reference to livestock, 
houses and other assets 
(Keane et al., 2016; factor)
Very Poor (N = 35), Poor (N = 79), 
Moderate (N = 78), Rich (N = 20)
x
Education [None] [Primary] 
[Secondary]
Survey, self-reported (none, 
primary or secondary; factor)
None (N = 72), Primary (N = 124), 
Secondary (N = 16)
x
Village [1] [2] [3] Survey (factor) Village 1 (N = 80), Village 2 (N = 68), 
Village 3, (N = 64)
x
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Participants were interviewed before and after each game with 
an orally administered pre-game survey and a structured post-
game debrief interview. These were carried out by the lead author 
and two research assistants, who provided translations from Maa 
and Swahili to English. Back translations were used during the for-
mation of survey questions to ensure that they were translated 
appropriately. The individual pre-game survey included a range of 
socio-demographic questions including age, education, wealth and 
occupation. Three components of trustworthiness—ability, integ-
rity and benevolence—were each measured using 4-point Likert-
type questions. We also recorded self-reported levels of wildlife 
damage, fear of elephants and four measures of elephant toler-
ance. Post-game structured debrief interviews with groups (20 
groups, 80 participants) and individuals (N = 132) explored partic-
ipant understanding and the factors influencing their cooperation 
decisions.
This study was approved by the University of Edinburgh School 
of GeoSciences Ethics Committee. We received oral informed 
consent from participants to participate in this research. This was 
obtained orally following the provision of information sheets and 
appropriate spoken translations, and participants were told that 
they did not have to continue with any interview or game if they did 
not feel comfortable (Tindana, Kass, & Akweongo, 2006). We did 
not seek written consent due to high levels of illiteracy in the study 
population. We anonymized both raw game, survey and debrief data 
to ensure that no personal information could be traced back to in-
dividuals (John et al., 2016). These data were stored digitally in the 
field on a password-protected laptop and was not shared with any 
other parties.
2.3 | Data analysis
We conducted our analyses in r (version 3.4.4; R Development Core 
Team, 2016) using the statistical package lme4 (Bates, Sarkar, Bates, 
& Matrix, 2007). As individual levels of cooperation did not show a 
statistically significant trend over rounds (Figure S3), we summed 
the cooperation score for each player over the five rounds of each 
treatment. To test whether cooperation differed between interven-
ing groups, a priori predictors of cooperation and socio-demographic 
variables, we ran a series of generalized linear mixed effect models 
with binomial errors (Table 2). Unique identifiers for groups (N = 53) 
and participants (N = 212) were modelled with independent random 
intercepts reflecting the grouping structure within the data. These 
groups did not account for participants' village, which was instead 
included as a categorical predictor variable. The three items of trust-
worthiness (Cronbach's alpha 0.77, 0.95 CI: 0.73–0.80), and four 
items of tolerance (Cronbach's alpha 0.65, 0.95 CI: 0.57–0.71), were 
each aggregated by summation using their weighted factor scores 
generated from factor analysis with the r packages nFactors and 
psych (Supporting Information Data analysis). To identify the fre-
quency of prevailing reasoning themes in the post-game interviews, 
we used directed content analysis (Hsieh & Shannon, 2005).
3  | RESULTS
In the framed public goods game, the proportion of participants 
cooperating was consistently higher in the local group treatment 
(‘Moran’) than in the WMA treatment. In the absence of other covar-
iates, treatment was a significant predictor of cooperation, and the 
odds that participants cooperate with the Moran were 60% greater 
than for the WMA (p < 0.01, odds ratio 0.41, 0.95 CI: 0.32–0.54; 
Model 1). The time of day in which the game was played (morning 
or afternoon) was not significant, but cooperation was significantly 
lower in games in which the WMA treatment came first (p < 0.01, 
odds ratio 0.32, 0.95 CI: 0.14–0.69; Model 1).
Levels of cooperation corresponded closely to perceptions of the 
trustworthiness of each group. When our aggregate trustworthiness 
score was included alongside treatment (Model 2), the effect size of 
treatment was no longer distinguishable from zero—suggesting that 
the effect of treatment is mediated by perceived levels of trustwor-
thiness (Figures S3 and S4). When aggregate trustworthiness was re-
placed as a predictor in the model by the three-component measures 
(Model 3), benevolence and integrity were found to be significant 
predictors of cooperation, but ability was not. Integrity was a stronger 
predictor of cooperation (odds ratio 1.88, 0.95 CI: 1.55–2.28), with an 
odds ratio 25% greater than for benevolence (odds ratio 1.50, 0.95 CI: 
1.20–1.87).
To explore the robustness of this finding, we ran further 
models which included a range of a priori predictors of cooper-
ation and socio-demographic variables (Table 2). Assessments of 
the intervener's benevolence and integrity continued to be the 
strongest positive predictors of cooperation. Elephant tolerance, 
experience of crop loss and elephant fear did not predict coop-
eration. The extent to which participants self-identified as agri-
culturist (livelihood) positively predicted cooperation in Model 4, 
but this effect was removed when other socio-demographic vari-
ables (age, village, education) were included in Model 5 (Figure 1). 
No interaction effects were observed between any variable and 
treatment. In Model 5, the variables which predicted coopera-
tion levels included the following: benevolence (odds ratio, 1.63, 
0.95 CI: 1.31–2.03), integrity (odds ratio, 1.78, 0.95 CI: 1.46–2.18), 
education (primary; odds ratio, 3.48, 0.95 CI: 0.54–22.10), order 
(WMA first; odds ratio 0.29, 0.95 CI: 0.12–0.71) and wealth (rich; 
odds ratio 0.14, 0.95 CI: 0.02–0.80; Figure 1). These results sug-
gest that, accounting for every other variable, the estimated prob-
ability of cooperation increases 1.78 times per unit increase in 
integrity-related trustworthiness, which is 9% greater than the 
1.63 increase in likelihood of cooperation per unit increase of 
benevolence-related trustworthiness.
In post-game individual debriefs (N = 132), respondents most 
often justified their game decision by referring to the perceived ef-
fectiveness of the intervening group (55% of respondents), compared 
to perceived benevolence (17%), integrity (17%), general benefits of 
cooperation (20%), wildlife conservation (2%) and game strategy 
(2%). The importance placed on effectiveness in debriefs stands in 
contrast to behaviour observed within the game itself. Reasoning 
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related to the effectiveness of the WMA and the Moran as guarders 
was given in equal measure, but benevolence- (13% more people) 
and integrity-based reasoning (6% more people) was biased towards 
the Moran (Figure 2).
4  | DISCUSSION
This study affirms that the perceived trustworthiness of the group 
delivering a conservation intervention predicts the levels of stake-
holder cooperation. It also finds that different components of trust-
worthiness—perceived ability, benevolence and integrity—differ in 
their influence.
Our result that trustworthiness predicts cooperation was unsur-
prising given previous findings and the nature of public goods games. 
Indeed, in both public goods games (Bouma, Bulte, & Van Soest, 2008) 
and natural resource management (Davenport et al., 2007), cooper-
ation is known to vary with the levels of trust held between partici-
pants. Trust is also known to heavily shape stakeholder responses to 
wildlife management efforts, including where these efforts are con-
tested (Riley et al., 2018; Schroeder et al., 2017; Young, Searle, et al., 
2016). However, in some cases, higher trust actually leads to reduced 
engagement with interveners, as individuals have confidence that the 
interveners will act competently, and in their interest, without their in-
volvement (Smith et al., 2013; Terpstra, 2011). In such situations, indi-
viduals are exercising vulnerability (and thus displaying organizational 
trust; Pirson & Malhotra, 2010; Riley et al., 2018) by not engaging. By 
contrast, in our game, participants exercised vulnerability (regarding 
expected earnings) by cooperating. Furthermore, through triangula-
tion with debrief interviews, we are confident that greater coopera-
tion in the games reflected more positive perceptions of the intentions 
of each intervening group.
What was unexpected, however, was our finding that percep-
tions of integrity and benevolence were stronger predictors of 
cooperation than ability. This finding also appears to contradict 
sentiments expressed in our post-game debrief interviews, in which 
intervener competence was most frequently emphasized. However, 
we cannot ascertain to what extent post-game justifications re-
flect post hoc rationalizations or actual drivers of game behaviour. 
From previous studies (Riley et al., 2018; Rudolph & Riley, 2017) 
it is clear that beyond rational outcome-based assessments, per-
ceptions of intervener integrity and benevolence are also import-
ant in dictating responses to wildlife interventions, but the relative 
importance of each construct is less clear. For instance, percep-
tions of managers' trustworthiness (including perceived levels of 
deception) have been shown to influence stakeholder compliance 
(Shirley & Gore, 2019) and cooperation or support for interventions 
(Hamm, 2017; Ordoñez-Gauger, Richmond, Hackett, & Chen, 2018). 
In some quantitative (Hamm et al., 2016), and qualitative (Wald, 
Nelson, Gawel, & Rogers, 2018) studies of the different measures 
of trustworthiness, the relative importance of each construct has 
been found to be equally important. However, in other related stud-
ies, perceptions of procedural justice—which are in turn shaped by 
the perceptions of trustworthiness, notably benevolence (Rudolph 
& Riley, 2017)—have overshadowed the perceptions of managers' 
technical competence in predicting the levels of cooperation or en-
gagement with management interventions (Rudolph & Riley, 2014; 
Smith et al., 2013). Hence, both our results and those from the 
wider literature suggest that the relative importance of different 
F I G U R E  1   Results from a generalized linear mixed effects 
model (Model 5), showing the estimated conditional effects of 
each predictor variable on cooperation within games. Filled dots 
represent model coefficient estimates converted to odds ratios, 
which show the expected change in likelihood of cooperation 
when each continuous variable increases by a unit of one, or 
when each factor variable changes level from a baseline (unfilled 
dots). Whiskers span the 95% confidence interval and variables 
with whiskers that do not cross zero are considered to have a 
statistically meaningful effect. Larger odds ratios indicate greater 
predicted strength of association
F I G U R E  2   The proportion of participants in individual post-
game debriefs (N = 132), who justified in-game cooperation 
with reasoning related to: the ability, benevolence or integrity of 
themselves or the intervening groups (bar colour), the benefits of 
cooperation generally or concerns related to wildlife  
conservation
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trustworthiness constructs on responses to conflict interventions 
may be context-dependent.
From our interviews, and from previous studies in the region, 
there appear to be numerous factors which are likely to shape 
the (often negative) perceptions of the trustworthiness of the 
local conservation managers studied here. In this study location 
(Homewood, 2017), and across Tanzania, trust in conservation 
has been depleted by community displacement, resource restric-
tions and broken promises (Bluwstein et al., 2016; Moyo, Ijumba, & 
Lund, 2016; Wright, 2017). Elsewhere, interpersonal trust in natu-
ral resource managers has been found to be shaped by the percep-
tions of their responsiveness, honesty and dedication (Davenport 
et al., 2007). In our interviews, respondents commonly identified a 
lack of transparency, compassion and accountability within the WMA 
and previous conservation programs. Such experiences might ex-
plain the greater importance placed on perceptions of benevolence 
and integrity, which inform affinitive trust-based assessments (Stern 
& Coleman, 2015). Nonetheless, conceivably our analysis failed to 
capture the effect of ability—perhaps due to the relatively lower 
variation observed for this component. Indeed, in debrief interviews 
interveners' ability was by far the justification most commonly used 
by participants to explain their game behaviours. Likewise, it is likely 
that the relative importance of each component of trustworthiness 
is context-dependent. For instance, intervention preferences (Keane 
et al., 2016), risk perceptions (Gore & Kahler, 2012) and trust (Shirley 
& Gore, 2019; Xiao & McCright, 2015) have been shown to differ 
across different groups and geographies. Hence, rather than identi-
fying which trustworthiness constructs generally matter more, this 
study highlights that they matter differentially.
Our approach further demonstrates the value of using experimen-
tal games to study conservation interventions (Andersson et al., 2018). 
Previous studies (Hamm et al., 2016; Smith et al., 2013; Wald 
et al., 2018) have gained rich insights into stakeholder cooperation or 
support using surveys or interviews. By contrast, games enable experi-
mental manipulation, but unrealistic incentives can lead to poor exter-
nal validity (i.e. low correspondence to real-world behaviour; Redpath 
et al., 2018). Here, this pitfall is minimized as our conclusions rest on 
relative, not absolute, differences in cooperation between groups. 
Likewise, although within-game behaviour and consistency can be in-
fluenced by other factors (e.g. group dynamics, or game-order, com-
munication, or game-understanding; Andersson et al., 2018; Aswani 
et al., 2013; Cookson, 2000), here the lack of variation in cooperation 
across rounds demonstrates apparent consistency in decision-making 
throughout the game, and our mixed effects model accounted for be-
tween-group variation. However, we did find that having WMA in the 
first round significantly reduces cooperation in the subsequent round 
with Moran, which demonstrates that game decisions were at least 
somewhat influenced by participants' previous experiences within the 
games (in this instance, lower levels of previous group cooperation). 
Furthermore, one constraint on the external validity of the study stems 
from the lack of disclosure and discussions of in-game decisions. This 
is because in reality, wildlife guarding and related cooperation deci-
sions would likely be publically known and subject to discussion and 
influence between individuals (Lowassa, Tadie, & Fischer, 2012; Travers, 
Clements, Keane, & Milner-Gulland, 2011). For instance, on the basis of 
previous research (Andersson et al., 2018), we suggest that more open 
communication in our game would have increased cooperation, partic-
ularly where perceptions of intervener trustworthiness were lower, and 
that such possible communication effects warrant further study.
When using experimental games to study behaviour, it is also 
good practice to draw upon qualitative data to validate and contex-
tualize the experimental results (Redpath et al., 2018). Triangulation 
between pre-game interviews, game behaviour and post-game de-
briefs also gives us confidence that players were making their deci-
sions based upon their own experiences with each group and were 
interpreting the target concepts in the intended manner. Moreover, 
the negative association of the rich wealth category, and positive 
association of primary education, with game cooperation should be 
interpreted carefully due to the wide confidence intervals of their 
estimated effects (Figure 1); however, similar demographic effects 
have been found elsewhere to shape trust-based responses to re-
source managers (Shirley & Gore, 2019).
Our findings have several important implications for conserva-
tion policy and practice. Firstly, we show that perceptions of inter-
vener's trustworthiness mediate differential levels of support for 
conflict interventions. This finding adds to previous work identify-
ing how behavioural responses to conservation interventions are 
shaped by the relationships between interveners and recipients 
of interventions (Rizzolo, Gore, Ratsimbazafy, & Rajaonson, 2017; 
Sjölander-Lindqvist et al., 2015), including the levels of stakeholder 
trust (Davenport et al., 2007; Riley et al., 2018; Smith et al., 2013). 
Those designing conservation interventions should therefore 
closely consider stakeholder relations and messenger effects 
(Dolan et al., 2012; Veríssimo, Tully, & Douglas, 2019), and explore 
whether particular individuals, third-parties or local institutions 
might be more effective in delivering interventions than others if 
they are more highly trusted or trained in stakeholder engagement 
(Riley et al., 2018; Sommerville, Jones, Rahajaharison, & Milner-
Gulland, 2010; Young, Searle, et al., 2016). Secondly, our findings 
that beliefs about an intervener's integrity and benevolence were 
stronger predictors of cooperation than beliefs about their ability 
suggest that technical interventions or enforcement (such as efforts 
to reduce crop-raiding or illegal killing) might benefit from accom-
panying efforts to improve the perceptions of trustworthiness and 
build greater affinitive-based trust between resource users and re-
source managers (Rudolph & Riley, 2017; Stern & Coleman, 2015). 
Thirdly, this study further suggests that improving the perceptions 
of trustworthiness and building affinitive-based trust is likely im-
portant in improving the success of community-based conservation 
programs (Redpath et al., 2017; Shirley & Gore, 2019). Although 
challenging, improving greater stakeholder trust in such communi-
ty-based settings can be realized in several ways, ranging from im-
proving communication and transparency (Rudolph & Riley, 2017), to 
active mediation efforts (Madden & McQuinn, 2015) and collabora-
tive decision-making (Mishra et al., 2017; Young, Searle, et al., 2016), 
to avoiding making unrealistic promises (Mabele, 2017).
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While these findings need to be tested across a range of contexts, 
elsewhere, the levels of protest, illegal harvest and active opposition 
to conservation have been found to be associated with perceptions of 
managers' honesty and fairness (linked to integrity; Shirley & Gore, 2019; 
Stern, 2008a), perceptions of care and community-mindedness (linked to 
benevolence; Hamm et al., 2016) and general levels of affinitive trust (Stern 
& Baird, 2015). Nonetheless, wildlife impacts (Cusack et al., 2018) and trust 
(Stern, 2008b) can shift over time, and that continued engagement and 
responsive approaches may be required for long-term conservation suc-
cess (Butler et al., 2015). Future work could explore the relative importance 
of other types of trust, such as negative trust and systems-based trust 
(Stern & Baird, 2015), uncertainty (Pollard et al., 2019), how perceptions 
of trustworthiness are shaped by demographic background, cultural affilia-
tions and norms (Rizzolo et al., 2017), and how insights from experimental 
games correspond to those derived from other methods.
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